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Abstract
Systematic failure to perform exclusion (making a response that opposes the participant’s natural inclinations) for brieXy displayed,
masked words has been interpreted as evidence of unconscious perception. The present study required participants to make a forced-
choice exclusion after viewing masked word targets. The forced-choice exclusion task was properly performed in all experiments, in
contrast to previous studies that have utilized stem-completion as a dependent variable. The exclusion failure eVects interpreted as
unconscious perception in earlier studies appear to be caused by an insensitive dependent variable (stem-completion) rather than
unconscious perception.
© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Unconscious cognition1. Introduction
The characterization of the conscious and unconscious
elements of perception has been a long-standing goal of
psychological research, dating back to the late 1800s (Sidis,
1898). Most investigators would agree that unconscious
processes play an important role in perception. There is lit-
tle consensus, however, regarding how the unconscious
components of perception can be isolated from conscious
experience and studied in pure form (for recent reviews, see
Erdelyi, 2004; Holender & Duscherer, 2004; Merikle,
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin,
2004). The lack of consensus may be partly due to the meth-
odology used to study unconscious perception. Typically,
the classic dissociation paradigm is used. The goal of this
approach is to Wnd evidence of perceptual sensitivity occur-
ring in the absence of awareness. Dissociations between
perceptual sensitivity and awareness are diYcult to inter-
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doi:10.1016/j.visres.2006.08.023pret, because such Wndings could reasonably be attributed
to conscious perception accompanied by a conservative
decision criterion (Fisk & Haase, 2005; Haase & Fisk, 2001;
Snodgrass, 2002).
The exclusion task from the process dissociation para-
digm has been advocated for overcoming the limitations of
the classic dissociation approach (Debner & Jacoby, 1994;
Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997; Merikle & Joordens,
1997a; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). In an exclusion
task, consciously perceived information must be intention-
ally used to respond in a way that does not match the dis-
played target. For example, a brieXy displayed, masked
word stimulus might be presented, followed by a stem-com-
pletion task in which the participant is asked to create a
word from the stem that does not match the displayed tar-
get word (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995). If
the target was consciously perceived, the participant gener-
ates a word that does not match the target. Unconsciously
perceived information, however, cannot be excluded
because it is unavailable to conscious decision processes.
The displayed stimulus might, nonetheless, inXuence
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Booker, Schacter, & Davis, 1990), thereby producing exclu-
sion failure (i.e., completing the stem with the displayed tar-
get word contrary to instructions). Findings of elevated
exclusion failure at short target durations have thus been
interpreted as evidence of unconscious perception (Debner
& Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995). According to advo-
cates of the exclusion approach, the primary advantage is
that the conscious or unconscious status of a percept can be
determined without the need to establish null awareness
(Merikle & Joordens, 1997a). The popularity of the exclu-
sion approach is increasing, with recent studies employing
this methodology to study unconscious perception in clini-
cal populations (Esterman et al., 2002), hemispheric diVer-
ences in perception (Fecteau, Kingstone, & Enns, 2004;
Smith & Bulman-Fleming, 2004), attentional blink (Visser,
Merikle, & DiLollo, 2005), repetition priming (Matsumoto,
Iidaka, Nomura, & Ohira, 2005), and the lexical status of
priming eVects (Hutchison, Neely, Neill, & Walker, 2004).
Although the exclusion task has advantages over the
classic dissociation approach, a number of studies question
the validity of this procedure for distinguishing between the
conscious and unconscious components of perception. Vis-
ser and Merikle (1999) report that exclusion failure eVects
suggestive of unconscious perception can be eliminated by
giving the participants a monetary incentive for correct per-
formance. In their study, the motivated group showed
exclusion success with 50 ms masked targets; these results
contradict previous studies that showed exclusion failure
with similar stimuli and display parameters. The Wndings
from this study could be interpreted in several ways. Per-
haps the participants in the motivated group allocated
more attention to the task, which permitted them to con-
sciously perceive the targets on more trials and thus achieve
successful exclusion (Merikle & Joordens, 1997b). Visser
and Merikle’s results can also be conceptualized as a
manipulation of decision criteria. According to Snodgrass
(2002), the monetary incentive provided by Visser and Mer-
ikle encouraged a more liberal identiWcation decision crite-
rion and thereby eliminated exclusion failure eVects.
Essentially, the participants were more willing to con-
sciously acknowledge Xeeting perceptions of the “noisy”
target word when they had a Wnancial incentive. If this
interpretation is correct, exclusion failure eVects are the
product of a conservative decision criterion rather than
unconscious perception. These interpretations suggest that
the stimuli used in previous reports of exclusion failure can
be consciously perceived, thereby raising questions about
whether the Wndings of exclusion failure in previous studies
should be interpreted as solely unconscious.
A number of other studies performed after Visser and
Merikle (1999) have also raised questions about the validity
of exclusion-based approaches to the study of unconscious
perception. Exclusion failure can be obtained at relatively
long target durations that are likely to have a signiWcant
degree of conscious perception (Debner & Jacoby, 1994;
Fecteau et al., 2004; Fisk & Haase, in press). In fact, it issometimes diYcult to demonstrate that exclusion instruc-
tions are properly performed at long target durations (Fisk
& Haase, in press). Furthermore, exclusion failure is typi-
cally accompanied by moderately high levels of word vs.
nonword discrimination sensitivity (Fisk & Haase, in
press). As a result, exclusion failure eVects do not occur
when the participants are incapable of reporting the target
stimulus (Bengson, 2005). These Wndings support the inter-
pretation that exclusion failure eVects should be considered
subjective threshold phenomena that would, at best, pro-
vide only weak evidence of unconscious perception (Snod-
grass, 2002).
Additional evidence that raises questions the uncon-
scious status of exclusion failure is that exclusion failure
does not consistently occur for all stimulus items. Fisk and
Haase (in press, Experiment 3) found that most word tar-
gets do not produce exclusion failure, but a small number
of word–word stem combinations consistently produced
high levels of exclusion failure. A similar result has been
obtained by Bengson (2005), who found that exclusion fail-
ure eVects occur when results are aggregated by stimulus
items, rather than by participant. These Wndings raise the
possibility that exclusion failure eVects may be an experi-
mental artifact.
The present experiments were performed to further eval-
uate the validity of exclusion methods for the study of
unconscious perception. Unlike previous studies employing
stem-completion tasks, the present work utilized a con-
strained exclusion task (two alternative forced choice:
2AFC) as an expression of perceptual processing. This
exclusion task required observers to pick the word in a
2AFC exclusion that was not the presented target word on
each trial. For example, observers were shown a target
word stimulus (e.g., “PLACE”), then asked to choose the
opposite stimulus in a forced-choice exclusion task (e.g.,
choosing the word “NIGHT” instead of “PLACE” when
given a choice between “NIGHT” and “PLACE”). Exclu-
sion performance was examined at diVerent levels of dis-
crimination (word vs. nonword) conWdence. The primary
goal was to reveal qualitative patterns of responding that
might provide evidence of conscious or unconscious per-
ception in exclusion paradigms.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The participants were 84 undergraduate students from Georgia South-
western State University. The participants were assigned to one of four
experiments that had diVerent target durations and discrimination task
conditions (see below). The students received extra credit in their Intro-
ductory Psychology class for their participation. All participants spoke
English as their native language and had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity.
2.2. Materials and apparatus
The visual stimuli were controlled with the Micro Experimental Labo-
ratory software application (MEL; version 2.0 for MS-DOS; Psychology
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ends computer (Intel 486sx microprocessor, 25 MHz). The word stimuli
were Wve-letter English words obtained from word frequency norms
(Kucera & Francis, 1967). The 64 words used in the experiment were
divided into 32 pairs. The word pairings were made to control for word
frequency eVects (i.e., targets and distractors had a similar frequency) and
order eVects. The eight nonwords from the noise trials (see below) and the
eight masking stimuli (see below) were composed of Wve-letter strings of
random letters that did not resemble an English word or the target stimuli.
In all experiments, the target stimuli were words (50% of all trials) or
nonwords (50% of all trials) presented for either 43 ms (two experiments)
or 57 ms (two experiments). The targets were presented between 500 ms
forward and backward masks of randomly selected letters. These display
parameters were chosen to be similar to previous studies reporting exclu-
sion failure eVects (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Merikle et al., 1995; Visser &
Merikle, 1999).
2.3. Experimental protocol
In the Wrst set of experiments, the participants received either 43 ms
targets (N D 20) or 57 ms targets (N D 20). Each stimulus presentation was
followed by a word–nonword discrimination task on a rating scale of one
to six, with higher ratings indicating increasing conWdence that a word tar-
get was presented. As in previous studies, the word choices from the 2AFC
exclusion task were made available to the participants during the word
discrimination task (Haase & Fisk, 2001; Merikle & Reingold, 1990). Next,
the participants were required to make an exclusion response in a 2AFC
task. The target word and the corresponding distractor were shown side by
side during the exclusion phase of each trial. Observers were instructed to
choose the word in the word pair that was not the presented target, thereby
creating an exclusion task (see Table 1). The exclusion task was performed
on all trials, regardless of whether a word or nonword target was dis-
played. The trials were divided into Wve blocks with 64 trials in each block,
with time for a break between each block.
The second set of experiments was the same as the Wrst set except that
the discrimination task was modiWed so that the target and distractor
words were not available to the participants during the discrimination
task. This was done to avoid any priming from the discrimination task to
the subsequent forced-choice task, thus keeping the two tasks more sepa-
rated than in the Wrst set of experiments. Otherwise, the tasks and other
experimental parameters were the same as in the Wrst set of experiments. In
these two experiments, 22 participants received 43 ms targets and 22 par-
ticipants received 57 ms targets.
2.4. Data analysis
Summary data were generated using the “analyze” program of the
MEL software package. All accuracy data from the exclusion experiments
were expressed as the proportion of exclusion errors (i.e., choosing the
same word as the target on the exclusion task despite instructions to
choose the distractor word) to facilitate comparisons to previous studies
using stem completion tasks. The mean proportion of exclusion errors on
signal + noise trials was expressed as a function of discrimination conW-
Table 1
Sequence of each experimental trial
Event Display examples Duration (ms)
Warning tone Blank 1000
Fixation stimulus — 1000
Forward mask XFBTA 500
Target (word/nonword) GROUP 43 or 57
Backward mask KWDYB 500
Discrimination rating (exclusion 
stimuli available or not available)
1–6 rating scale Until response
Exclusion POINT GROUP Until response
Intertrial interval Blank 500dence ratings to determine if exclusion was diVerent from random at low
conWdence ratings. In the 2AFC exclusion task, exclusion errors at 0.50 is
random performance. Exclusion performance signiWcantly below 0.50 (i.e.,
a reduction in exclusion errors or proper performance of the exclusion
task) is exclusion success, whereas exclusion performance signiWcantly
above 0.50 (i.e., an increase in exclusion errors) is exclusion failure.
The descriptive and inferential statistics were performed on exclusion
data from the discrimination ratings of each participant who had 10 or
more trials. Task accuracy as a function of discrimination conWdence rat-
ings was examined for below or above random exclusion performance at
the low discrimination conWdence ratings with single sample t-tests.
Accordingly, two-tailed cutoVs were used when testing for statistical sig-
niWcance, given that either above random (i.e., exclusion failure) or below
random (i.e., exclusion success) performance would be of potential interest.
Discrimination sensitivity was determined with methods based on
signal detection theory (Green, Weber, & Duncan, 1977; Macmillan &
Creelman, 1991) and mean exclusion performance conditional on discrim-
ination category rating. Discrimination sensitivity was expressed as da,
which is similar to the more familiar d except that da is more appropriate
for experiments with a rating scale design, especially when the noise and
signal + noise distributions have unequal variances (Macmillan &
Creelman, 1991).
Another method for evaluating unconscious perception eVects involves
comparing performance from exclusion tasks (i.e., producing a response
diVerent from the target) to inclusion tasks (i.e., matching the response to
the target). This strategy is used by a number of investigators (Debner &
Jacoby, 1994; Esterman et al., 2002; Fecteau et al., 2004; Matsumoto et al.,
2005; Visser & Merikle, 1999). The results from the experiments with
exclusion choices available during the discrimination task were compared
to results from two similar, previously published experiments performed
with inclusion instructions (Fisk & Haase, 2005). The hardware, software,
stimuli, display parameters (43 and 57 ms targets), and discrimination task
were exactly the same in this previous study, with the only diVerence being
that the participants matched the target to the stimulus choices (identiWca-
tion; an inclusion task). The relative proportions of conscious perception
and unconscious perception were determined using formulas
3 (C D inclusion ¡ exclusion) and 4 (U D exclusion/(1 ¡ C)) of Debner and
Jacoby (1994). The proportions were calculated for each group, then the
proportions of conscious perception and unconscious perception were
determined.
3. Results
The overall mean proportions of exclusion errors on
the signal + noise trials from the 57 and 43 ms exclusion
experiments with target choices present at discrimination
were .21 (SE D .02) and .45 (SE D .01), respectively. The
exclusion error rates in both experiments were signiW-
cantly below random (57 ms: t(19) D ¡11.99,
p < .0000000002; 43 ms: t(19) D ¡3.41, p < .003), thereby
demonstrating exclusion success. When the 2AFC exclu-
sion task choices were not shown during the discrimina-
tion task, the mean overall exclusion error rate was .35
(SE D .05) and .44 (SE D .02) in the 57 and 43 ms experi-
ments, respectively. Both of these results were signiW-
cantly below random performance (57 ms: t(21) D ¡3.31,
p < .003; 43 ms: t(21) D ¡3.13, p < .01). All of the present
experiments showed exclusion success (a signiWcant
decrease in exclusion errors relative to random perfor-
mance), a pattern that other investigators have inter-
preted as evidence of conscious perception.
Exclusion performance from the signal + noise trials was
further evaluated by comparison of exclusion errors at each
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experiments produced random or signiWcantly below ran-
dom exclusion errors at every discrimination rating (Fig. 1
and Table 2). The only exception was the “1” rating of the
57 ms experiment with exclusion choices present at discrim-
ination. This result, however, was not signiWcantly diVerent
from random (M D .55, SE D .02, t(3) D ¡2.01, p < .14),
mostly because very few participants chose the “1” rating in
this experiment (Fig. 1A). In contrast, the 57 ms experiment
in which the exclusion choices were not displayed had sig-
niWcantly decreased exclusion errors on word trials at the
lowest conWdence rating, which demonstrated exclusion
success. Participants in this experiment were apparentlyable to properly perform the exclusion task even on
signal + noise trials in which they had no conWdence in their
perception of the target stimulus.
In the experiment with 57 ms targets and choices present
during the discrimination task, the participants following
exclusion instructions made fewer errors (M D .21,
SD D .11) than participants who were given inclusion
instructions in a previous study (M D .29, SD D .12,
t(38) D ¡3.75, p < .0006). In other words, the participants in
the exclusion experiment performed better than the group
with the inclusion task. For the 43 ms experiment, errors
made under exclusion (M D .45, SD D .06) and inclusion
instructions (M D .43, SD D .07) were not signiWcantlyFig. 1. (A) The mean proportion of exclusion errors as a function of discrimination conWdence ratings 1–6 for signal + noise trials. Higher discrimination
ratings represent increasing conWdence that a word was displayed. Exclusion errors below .50 represent exclusion success (proper execution of the exclu-
sion task). (B) Relative frequency of responses at diVerent levels of discrimination rating.
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Exclusion choices not available during the discrimination task:
Exclusion choices available during the discrimination task:Table 2
Exclusion performance as a function of word–nonword discrimination
Mean exclusion errors by discrimination rating.
¤ p < .05, two-tailed.
Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6
Words at discrimination: 43 ms .49 .48 .46 .44 .37¤ .31¤
Words at discrimination: 57 ms .55 .40¤ .34¤ .28¤ .18¤ .10¤
No words at discrimination: 43 ms .49 .51 .48 .46 .41¤ .35¤
No words at discrimination: 57 ms .33¤ .45¤ .46 .40 .32¤ .20¤
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performance was also compared to exclusion performance
following the formulas of Debner and Jacoby (1994) to
determine the magnitude of the conscious and unconscious
elements of perception. For the 57 ms experiment with tar-
gets shown during discrimination, the conscious perception
element was 0.50 (C D .71 ¡ .21) and the unconscious per-
ception component was .42 (U D .21/(1 ¡ .50)). In the 43 ms
experiment, conscious perception was estimated to be .12
(C D .57 ¡ .45), whereas unconscious perception was .51
(U D .45/(1 ¡ .12)). In summary, the C component of per-
ception was larger than U in the experiment with 57 ms tar-
gets, but was smaller than U in the experiments with 43 ms
targets.
When the exclusion choices were present during discrim-
ination, discrimination sensitivity was signiWcantly greater
than zero in the 57 ms (da: M D 1.29, SE D .12, t(19) D 10.59,
p < .0000000002) and the 43 ms experiments (da: M D .27,
SE D .06, t(19) D 4.23, p < .0004). The discrimination da val-
ues were also above zero in the experiments without choices
during discrimination for both the 57 ms (M D .82, SE D .15,
t(22) D 5.57, p < .00001) and 43 ms (M D .26, SE D .09,
t(21) D 3.07, p < .005) experiments that lacked the exclusion
task choices during discrimination task.
4. Discussion
The present experiments demonstrate that forced choice
exclusion tasks consistently produce exclusion success (i.e.,
proper execution of the exclusion task). Exclusion success
was expressed as signiWcant decreases in exclusion errors
relative to random performance. On signal + noise trials
with low discrimination conWdence, most experiments had
random levels of exclusion performance. However, the
experiments with longer target durations sometimes pro-
duced evidence of exclusion success even when participants
lacked conWdence that a target word was displayed. There
was no evidence of exclusion failure (i.e., incorrect execu-
tion of the exclusion task due to presumably unconscious
inXuences). These results show that participants can inten-
tionally and deliberately choose the opposite of a brieXy
presented, masked target, which suggests that a suYcient
degree of information from the target is consciously per-
ceived to properly perform the exclusion task.
These results are consistent with an earlier study with a
forced-choice exclusion task (Haase & Fisk, 2001), but they
are completely contrary to other studies reporting exclusion
failure eVects (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Fecteau et al., 2004;
Fisk & Haase, in press; Hutchison et al., 2004; Merikle
et al., 1995; Smith & Bulman-Fleming, 2004; Visser et al.,
2005). These contrary results occurred even though the
present study utilized display parameters and stimuli that
were similar or identical to earlier studies reporting exclu-
sion failure. Perceptual diVerences between studies are,
therefore, unlikely to explain the inability to replicate exclu-
sion failure eVects. The discrepancy between studies is most
likely the dependent variable, which is invariably stem-completion tasks in studies reporting exclusion failure
eVects. Apparently stem-completion tasks are required for
producing exclusion failure eVects. The Wnding that exclu-
sion failure eVects are task-speciWc suggests that the exclu-
sion failure eVects obtained in previous studies could be
interpreted as an experimental artifact rather than uncon-
scious perception.
A potential criticism of the current Wndings is that the
2AFC exclusion task used in the present experiments might
be insensitive to unconscious perception. The forced-choice
task is a direct measure of perception, whereas stem com-
pletion is an indirect measure that might have greater sensi-
tivity to unconscious processes. For example, it is possible
that 2AFC exclusion could be performed in a way similar
to 2AFC identiWcation via perception of simple target stim-
ulus features. This might produce discrepancies between the
current Wndings and other studies reporting exclusion fail-
ure. Even if this criticism is valid, it must be acknowledged
that signiWcant conscious perception of the word stimuli is
occurring in the present experiments. By extension, other
studies reporting exclusion failure eVects with similar dis-
play parameters might also involve conscious perception of
word information. In addition, proper performance of the
current exclusion task requires participants to deliberately
and intentionally choose a word that is diVerent from the
presented target. The participants in the experiments with
57 ms targets, for example, are highly accurate on the exclu-
sion task. This degree of exclusion accuracy would only be
possible if conscious perception were involved. Altogether,
the Wndings suggest that conscious perception is likely
under the display parameters used in the present experi-
ments, even though the stimulus settings are similar to pre-
vious studies reporting exclusion failure eVects.
Although some investigators might criticize 2AFC
exclusion for being insensitive to unconscious perception, it
would be equally valid to make the converse interpretation:
perhaps exclusion tasks based on stem-completion tasks
are simply insensitive to conscious perception. In support
of this interpretation, we have found that exclusion experi-
ments with stem-completion tasks sometimes fail to dem-
onstrate evidence of conscious perception such as exclusion
success at long stimulus durations (Fisk & Haase, in press).
If exclusion based on stem-completion are less sensitive to
conscious perception than 2AFC exclusion, then we would
expect that 2AFC exclusion would show much stronger evi-
dence of conscious perception, which is consistent with the
outcome of the present experiments. Evidence in support of
this viewpoint comes from experiments comparing free
report, cued free report, and forced-choice performance of
masked word targets (Johnston, 1978). Johnston’s results
showed that correct identiWcation of the target was lowest
in the free report condition (.31), intermediate in the cued
free report condition (.54 to.55), and highest in the forced-
choice condition (.77 to .80). These Wndings are analogous
to the diVerences between exclusion studies based on stem
completion, which could be considered a form of cued free
report, and the present results based on a forced choice
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ences between stem completion-based and 2AFC-based
exclusion is Sophisticated Guessing Theory. This theory
proposes that participants perceive some limited degree of
information from masked word targets, then use that infor-
mation to narrow down the possible response possibilities
to a small set of reasonable alternatives (Nakatani, 1973;
Solomon & Postman, 1952). In 2AFC exclusion, there are
only two possible response alternatives, so even a small
amount of consciously perceived stimulus information
could potentially guide participant responses. In contrast,
there may be many possible completions for a stem (e.g., the
stem “SPI__” could be completed as “SPIKE”, “SPICE”,
“SPIRE”, “SPIT”, etc.). This would make it more diYcult
to use any marginal conscious perception of the target to
guide responding, thereby leading to lower overall sensitiv-
ity to conscious perception. The key point is that stem com-
pletion tasks may simply lack sensitivity to conscious
perception, thus exclusion failure eVects are more likely to
be obtained with stem completion tasks than with 2AFC
exclusion.
The possibility that 2AFC exclusion is more sensitive to
the eVects of conscious perception than exclusion tasks
based upon stem-completion is consistent with the discrim-
ination sensitivity results. All experiments had word–non-
word discrimination sensitivity that was signiWcantly above
zero, suggesting that the targets were consciously perceived
on a substantial proportion of the trials. Given that the
present display parameters are similar to those used in pre-
vious studies, it is reasonable to assume that the exclusion
failure eVects in these earlier studies were accompanied by
signiWcant sensitivity to the target stimulus (Fisk & Haase,
in press). This result lends support to Snodgrass’ (2002)
interpretation of exclusion failure eVects as a subjective
threshold paradigm; exclusion success or failure only
occurs when participants have signiWcant sensitivity to the
target stimuli. The eVects of exclusion failure may thus
reXect a shift in the identiWcation criterion (Snodgrass,
2002). Participants with a conservative criterion might
doubt their consciously perceived information, then com-
plete the stem with the target. This failure to perform the
exclusion task would, however, make exclusion failure the
product of the decision criterion rather than an expression
of unconscious perception. Preliminary support for this
position has been obtained by Bengson (personal commu-
nication). In summary, the presence of signiWcant discrimi-
nation sensitivity raises doubts as to whether Wndings of
exclusion failure from previous studies can be unambigu-
ously interpreted as unconscious perception.
Debner and Jacoby (1994), who were the Wrst to use
exclusion tasks to study unconscious perception, focused
on estimating the relative contributions of conscious and
unconscious perception via the process dissociation frame-
work. Application of this logic to the present experiments
yielded contradictory results. Exclusion failure eVects sug-
gesting unconscious perception were not obtained in the
present experiments, yet the unconscious perception com-ponent was estimated at .51 and .42 in two experiments.
Furthermore, the U component was larger than the C com-
ponent in the 43 ms experiment, even though the overall
results of the experiment showed exclusion success (i.e.,
conscious perception). Although this seems paradoxical,
similar results have been obtained by other investigators
utilizing stem completion tasks. Visser and Merikle (1999)
found that motivational incentives produced exclusion suc-
cess instead of exclusion failure for 50 ms masked word tar-
gets, thereby suggesting conscious perception. The
magnitude of unconscious perception, however, in the
motivated group was estimated to be .22, which was only
about .08 lower than the control group that showed exclu-
sion failure eVects (see Fig. 2 of Visser & Merikle, 1999). It
is also noteworthy that the present study yielded larger esti-
mates of unconscious perception than Visser and Merikle
(1999). These estimates were larger than Visser and Merikle
(1999) even though the present study had similar display
parameters, no exclusion failure eVects, and a forced-choice
task instead of stem completion.
The contradictory pattern of these results (exclusion suc-
cess accompanied by signiWcant estimates of unconscious
perception) suggests that the algebraic logic underlying the
process dissociation procedure is Xawed. The qualitative
diVerence between exclusion performance and baseline per-
formance, such as either exclusion success or exclusion fail-
ure, is not considered in the process dissociation
calculations. It seems unlikely that the simple algebraic cal-
culations of the process dissociation procedure are accu-
rately estimating the magnitude of unconscious perception
given that the results have little relevance to the qualitative
nature of exclusion success or exclusion failure.
A closer examination of the mathematical formulas of
process dissociation illustrates the nature of the problem.
Debner and Jacoby (1994) calculated the conscious compo-
nent (C) of perception to be C D inclusion ¡ exclusion and
the unconscious perception component (U) to be
U D exclusion/(1 ¡ C). Participants are likely to make at
least a few errors on the exclusion task due to attentional
lapses or other factors. These errors would translate into
evidence of unconscious perception via the mathematics of
process dissociation. Problems arise, however, if exclusion
performance is perfect. When this occurs, C D inclusion ¡ 0,
and the magnitude of the unconscious component cannot
be calculated. Previous studies have addressed this problem
by discarding data from participants with perfect exclusion
performance. For example, Experiments 1 and 2 of Debner
and Jacoby (1994) had a substantial proportion of partici-
pants who achieved perfect performance (Experiment 1:
30%; Experiment 2: 25%). The data from these participants
were removed to estimate the magnitude of conscious per-
ception and unconscious perception. Other studies have
employed similar data elimination strategies when estimat-
ing the conscious and unconscious components. Visser and
Merikle (1999) did not calculate the proportions of con-
scious and unconscious perception at long target durations
because some participants had perfect performance on the
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had perfect performance on one side of a lateralized display
(Esterman et al., 2002). These investigators estimated the
relative contributions of conscious perception and uncon-
scious perception by combining the data from all partici-
pants to make a “macro-subject” (p. 242). These examples
show that when perfect exclusion performance is obtained,
the data are simply dropped when calculating the contribu-
tions of conscious and unconscious processing.
The problem of perfect exclusion performance in the
process dissociation calculations reveals a disturbing possi-
bility: the calculations are essentially Wxed a priori to pro-
vide evidence of unconscious perception. If the participants
make exclusion errors, then unconscious perception is
occurring. If they do not make exclusion errors, then the
results are simply uninterpretable. The only possible out-
come is results that support unconscious perception. It is
impossible to use the math of process dissociation to show
that unconscious perception is not occurring. The predic-
tions made by the simple math of the process dissociation
approach are not testable because they simply cannot be
refuted. As such, the process dissociation procedure
approach to the study of unconscious perception lacks sci-
entiWc merit.
We recently proposed a parsimonious explanation of
exclusion failure eVects that does not require an uncon-
scious mechanism (Fisk & Haase, in press). Incorrect execu-
tion of the exclusion task, such as completing the stem with
the target word, is a mistake. Exclusion tasks with stem
completion responses are challenging tasks, so most partici-
pants will make some mistakes (Block, 2001). For example,
studies employing exclusion tasks often Wnd that some par-
ticipants need to be removed from the data set for not fol-
lowing exclusion instructions (Debner & Jacoby, 1994;
Hutchison et al., 2004), which suggests that the exclusion
task is challenging. Furthermore, we would reasonably
anticipate that mistakes will increase as task diYculty
increases. Elevated exclusion failure can thus be viewed as
an simple increase in mistakes that occurs when task diY-
culty is increased. For example, more exclusion errors are
made at short target durations (e.g., 50 or 75 ms) than long
target durations (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Fisk & Haase, in
press; Merikle et al., 1995). Short target durations make a
diYcult exclusion task even harder to perform, thereby
leading to increased mistakes on the exclusion task (i.e.,
exclusion failure). Since the baseline rate of exclusion errors
is low to begin with (typically .10 to .25), only a modest
increase in errors due to elevated task diYculty is needed to
produce exclusion failure eVects. The interpretation of
exclusion failure as elevated mistakes caused by a confound
with task diYculty is also consistent with evidence that
exclusion failure eVects can be abolished with increased
incentives (Visser & Merikle, 1999). In short, exclusion fail-
ure eVects may be the product of confounding various
experimental manipulations with task diYculty. Additional
constructs, like unconscious perception, are unnecessary to
explain exclusion failure eVects.The present evidence is consistent with the interpreta-
tion of exclusion failure eVects outlined above. The
2AFC exclusion task contained dissimilar targets and
both choices were made available to the observers during
the response. The participants had little diYculty in
choosing the opposite of the target stimulus, resulting in
exclusion success in all experiments. On the other hand,
exclusion experiments with stem completion tasks as a
dependent variable require participants to make
responses that are highly similar to the target because all
potential responses must share the Wrst three letters. The
correlated nature of potential responses in stem comple-
tion tasks likely increases task diYculty, thereby leading
to more mistakes on the exclusion task and greater exclu-
sion failure eVects. The response options are also not
available to participants who are performing a stem com-
pletion task, requiring the participants to draw potential
responses from memory, likely over a period of many sec-
onds, which could increase the chances of conscious per-
ception followed by rapid forgetting (Holender &
Duscherer, 2004). Based on these task diVerences, we
would expect exclusion success to occur with a 2AFC
exclusion task, but exclusion failure to be obtained with
an exclusion stem-completion task. In essence, stem com-
pletion tasks produce elevated exclusion errors and
exclusion failure eVects at short durations simply because
these tasks are more diYcult to do than 2AFC exclusion.
Exclusion procedures appear to be gaining wider
acceptance as a means for studying unconscious percep-
tion, with a recent increase in the number of studies
employing this approach (Esterman et al., 2002; Fecteau
et al., 2004; Hutchison et al., 2004; Matsumoto et al.,
2005; Smith & Bulman-Fleming, 2004; Visser et al., 2005).
On the other hand, the number of studies questioning the
validity of exclusion paradigms is also increasing (Beng-
son, 2005; Fisk & Haase, in press; Haase & Fisk, 2001;
Snodgrass, 2002; Visser & Merikle, 1999). We feel that
the further use of exclusion tasks for studying uncon-
scious perception is not warranted at the present time.
The current evidence that exclusion failure represents
unconscious perception is simply not compelling. By
extension, the interpretation of exclusion failure as evi-
dence of unconscious perception in other experimental
paradigms or clinical populations lacks a solid founda-
tion. More work needs to be done to deWnitively establish
the validity of exclusion tasks and process dissociation
procedures before these techniques should be widely
accepted as an appropriate means for studying uncon-
scious perception.
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